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Abstract 
The use of behavioral targeting practices provides ad networks with the 
opportunity to tailor ads to the individual characteristics of users. As privacy 
concerns over behavioral targeting have been growing lately, an increasing number 
of ad networks offer ad preferences managers (APMs) that show collected and/or 
inferred information about users. The focus of our study is to investigate the 
accuracy and completeness of the information contained in such APMs. On the 
basis of our experimental results, we propose a structured methodology for APM 
validation. We also assess how third parties render ads based on users’ browsing 
behavior. Our findings reveal cases in which even sensitive information is leaked as 
part of an HTTP header and is used to serve ads on multiple sites. The third 
parties examined in this study include an intent-focused data exchange (BlueKai) 
and a social network (Facebook) along with the ad networks owned by AOL, 
Google, and Yahoo!. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The use of behavioral targeting practices provides online advertising networks with 
the opportunity to tailor advertisements to the individual characteristics of users. 
Third-party HTTP cookies are the most common means of tracking users’ 
browsing behavior [25, 41]. 
An increasing number of ad networks offer ad preferences managers (APMs) 
that show collected and/or inferred information about users. After Google launched 
a behavioral advertising program in March 2009 [18], privacy advocates praised its 
decision to provide users with access to their APMs and with an “opt-out” 
mechanism, but they also indicated Google needed to do more to let people know 
that their behavior was being monitored. The majority of American adults do not 
want ads to be rendered based on their interests and they believe that the law 
should obligate advertisers “to immediately delete information about their internet 
activity” [42]. 
 2 
A typical APM created by an aggregator consists of the following elements: 
areas of interest, IP-based/gathered geographic information (which may include zip 
code) as well as demographic variables such as age, gender, and income. Technical 
attributes (e.g., operating system, browser, screen resolution, and color depth) used 
to display ads appropriately for the user’s environment are also provided by some 
companies like Yahoo! [47]. Users can edit and/or remove most pieces of 
information in their APMs, primarily their interest categories. Moreover, most of 
the major ad networks allow users to opt out of ads targeted to their online 
behavior. 
In this work, we propose a methodology for testing the accuracy and 
completeness of the information in APMs made available to users by ad networks. 
We also assess how third parties render ads based on users’ browsing behavior. Our 
findings reveal cases in which even sensitive information is leaked as part of an 
HTTP header and is used to serve ads on multiple sites. The third parties 
examined in this study include an intent-focused data exchange (BlueKai) and a 
social network (Facebook) along with the ad networks owned by AOL, Google, and 
Yahoo!. 
 3 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 covers the background 
information. The methodology we used to study third parties is described in 
Chapter 3. The test results and the fundamental aspects of the Facebook test are 
given in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions 
and future directions. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
The rise of computational advertising has triggered systematic research on related 
systems. An experimental study [16] proposed a measurement methodology for 
online advertising networks. It defined new metrics that are resistant to significant 
levels of noise present in ad distribution. Wang et al. [45] developed an ad auditing 
methodology and demonstrated that it is capable of effectively monitoring ad 
networks on a large scale. A client-side method for detecting and classifying third-
party trackers based on how they manipulate browser state was introduced in [36]. 
Another relevant study [38] described how online ad exchanges work and found 
that the complexity of these systems provides criminals with an opportunity to 
gain revenue by writing malware that mimics legitimate user activities. 
As public concern over behavioral targeting has been growing lately, several 
studies, such as [12, 17, 34, 35, 41], have focused on privacy-preserving online 
advertising. A novel way to handle third-party cookies that allows users to have 
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control over information available to aggregators was introduced in [12]. Guha et 
al. [17] presented a system which maintains profiles locally on the users’ computers 
rather than in the cloud. A browser extension was proposed in [41] that enables the 
targeting algorithm to run in the browser. Riederer et al. [35] proposed a 
mechanism called ‘transactional’ privacy, in which users decide what information 
about themselves is put up for sale while receiving compensation for it, and third 
parties purchase access to exploit this information for ad targeting. Another recent 
study [34] addressed the problem of running auctions that leverage the information 
in the user profile for ad ranking while keeping the profile private. 
As demonstrated in [27, 28], leakage of behavioral data to third-party servers 
has been increasing dramatically in the past few years. Just as importantly, an 
additional study [26] showed that a third party can link the users’ browsing 
behavior to personal information and identifiers using data mined from online 
social networks (OSNs) that employ its and/or its affiliated third parties’ services. 
In a more recent study, Krishnamurthy et al. [24] examined over 100 popular non-
OSN Web sites and found leakage on 75% of these sites. Korolova [23] proposed a 
new class of attacks that exploit the microtargeting capabilities of Facebook’s 
advertising system in order to violate user privacy. 
 6 
In attempting to understand the sensitivity of information contained in 
behavioral profiles, it is noteworthy to consider that privacy researcher Latanya 
Sweeney’s study [39] revealed that 87% of the U.S. population can be uniquely 
identified solely by their 5-digit zip code, birth date, and gender. Furthermore, 
Narayanan and Shmatikov [31] emphasized the possibility of re-identification 
without personally identifiable information (PII). They noted that “any 
information that distinguishes one person from another can be used for re-
identifying anonymous data.” 
Current policy and technology research on third-party Web tracking is 
discussed in [30] based on the results from a new dynamic Web measurement 
platform, FourthParty. Numerous instances of non-compliance with behavioral 
advertising notice and choice requirements were identified in [22]. Wills [46] 
characterized the necessary conditions for private user information made available 
to a first-party site to be leaked to a third party and provided specific instances of 
where leakage occurs. He also showed how this leakage can be prevented through a 
number of actions available to end users as well as first-party sites. 
According to [20], users’ privacy preferences regarding sharing their locations 
with advertisers are complicated, and offering advanced privacy settings is helpful 
in mitigating their concerns about location-based advertising. As reported in [21], 
 7 
users are typically willing to trade off ease-of-use against higher levels of control 
over their personal information and are thus more comfortable with an explicit 
profiling system. 
 
2.1 Summary 
The rise of computational advertising has triggered systematic research on related 
systems. There is considerable ongoing effort to develop structured measurement 
methodologies for online advertising networks. As public concern over behavioral 
targeting has been growing lately, several studies have focused on privacy-
preserving online advertising. Also, a number of researchers studied leakage to 
third-party aggregators, the threat of re-identification of anonymous data, and 
users’ privacy preferences. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The third parties offering ad preferences managers (APMs) to end users without 
the need for an account include 33Across [1], AOL [3], Bizo [4], BlueKai [6], 
eXelate [10], Google [14], interclick [19], Lotame [29], TARGUSinfo [40], Videology 
[44], and Yahoo! [47]. We opted to examine the ad networks owned by Web giants 
Google, AOL, and Yahoo! and online data exchange BlueKai due to its distinct 
characteristics. BlueKai does not serve ads—it operates an online platform for 
intent-focused data exchange [5, 32]. Names of the APMs of the third parties 
examined in this study are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Names of the ad preferences managers of the third parties examined in this study 
 
Third party Name of APM 
AOL AdVisibility—My Advertising Preferences 
BlueKai BlueKai Registry 
Google Ads Preferences Manager 
Yahoo! Ad Interest Manager 
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We compiled a list of 15 first-party sites for each third party. We used a 
browser extension that automatically visits over 1000 popular sites and lists the 
third parties these sites utilize [9]. We identified the sites to be included in the test 
sets mostly using this list. We also included sites that fall into sensitive categories 
(health and sexual orientation) or that offer a profile page on which sensitive 
information can be provided. 
We ran daily sessions for a ten-day period for all third parties. A session 
comprises visiting 15 Web sites successively and performing pre-defined actions on 
these sites (such as reading technology news on nytimes.com or searching for 
information on skin cancer on medhelp.org). The same controlled browser (either 
IE, Chrome, or Opera) was used for an entire test—i.e., 10 daily sessions. Only 
before the first session, we deleted all cookies and history in the test browser. 
Whenever we needed to log on to a Web site, we did so and never logged out of it. 
During the sessions, we captured the ads served by the relevant ad server and 
checked the APM after visiting each site. We used the information Web traffic 
analysis companies Alexa [2], Compete [7], and Quantcast [33] provide about the 
first-party sites to verify the information shown in the APM. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that an interest category is generated based on what is displayed on a 
Web site we visit even if that category does not pertain to the intended nature of 
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the site. We also recorded the HTTP traffic and inspected the HTTP headers using 
Fiddler [11], an HTTP(S) debugging proxy, to find out what is passed to the ad 
server in plaintext. However, it should be remembered that leakage can be 
deliberate or inadvertent—i.e., third parties may not be expecting all information 
they receive. 
To classify ads, we used the following categories: 
Expected types of advertising. The advertising practices that are expected 
to be observed are as follows: 
 generic: No information pertinent to the user is used. 
 location-based: IP-based geographic information is used. 
 contextual: The ad is related to what is currently displayed on the page. 
 behavioral—in APM: The advertised product/service directly relates to 
previous online behavior, and a relevant category, at a minimum, is shown 
in the APM. 
 based on profile on that page: A piece of information that is in the profile 
on that page is used. 
Unexpected types of advertising. The advertising practices that are not 
expected to be observed are as follows: 
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 behavioral—not in APM: The advertised product/service directly relates to 
previous online behavior, although a relevant category is not shown in the 
APM. 
 based on previous profile: A piece of information that is available in a 
profile on a previously-visited page is used. 
 based on sensitive behavior: The ad is related to past sensitive behavior 
(visiting a gay site, searching for a disease on a health site, etc.). 
 
 
  
Past 
Sensitive 
Behavior 
   
 
 
Known User Info 
 
 
 
 
 
Past 
Demographic 
Info 
No Known 
Info 
Location Current 
Demographic 
Info 
Past 
Behavior 
not in APM 
Inferred 
From 
User 
Behavior 
Past 
Behavior 
in APM 
Current 
Behavior 
No Known 
Behavior 
 
Figure 1: Two-dimensional classification of online advertising practices 
(inner square: expected results, remaining boxes: unexpected results) 
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We developed a two-dimensional classification to illustrate the advertising 
practices we observed during our tests (see Figure 1). The inner square is used to 
show expected results, and the remaining boxes are used to show unexpected 
results. 
The subsequent subsections list the first-party sites (and their categories based 
on the information obtained from Alexa [2], Compete [7], and Quantcast [33]) used 
to study each third party. 
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3.1 Google 
Table 2: First-party sites used to study Google 
 
Site Category 
accuweather.com News, Weather 
bloomberg.com News, Business 
cbsnews.com News 
gaylife.about.com Gay People 
linkedin.com Professional Networking 
macmillandictionary.com Dictionaries, English 
medhelp.org Health 
metrolyrics.com Music, Lyrics 
nytimes.com News, Newspapers 
pandora.com Radio 
snagajob.com Employment, Job Search 
tmz.com News, Entertainment, Celebrities 
toyota.com Automotive, Toyota 
tripadvisor.com Travel 
yelp.com Consumer Opinions 
 
The actions performed on the sites listed in Table 2 included searching for 
“Miami” (on accuweather.com, tripadvisor.com, and yelp.com) and for “skin 
cancer” (on medhelp.org). 
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3.1.1 Disabling third-party cookies and opting out 
We performed an additional Google test by disabling third-party cookies and 
another one by opting out of customized Google Display Network ads to 
understand whether these mechanisms are truly useful for preventing behavioral 
targeting of ads. 
After 10 sessions with the sites listed in Table 2, we enabled third-party cookies 
(opted in during the other test) and ran 3 extra sessions with 5 other sites that are 
listed in Table 3. This enabled us to see if we were targeted during these extra 
sessions based on our behavior in the first 10 sessions. 
 
Table 3: First-party sites visited in the extra Google sessions 
 
Site Category 
ehow.com How-To Guide 
imdb.com Movies 
reference.com Information Reference 
target.com Retailers 
wunderground.com1 News, Weather 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 We searched for the weather forecast in New York on this site. 
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3.2 AOL 
Table 4: First-party sites used to study AOL 
 
Site Category 
autoblog.com Automotive 
autos.aol.com Automotive 
cars.com Automotive 
encyclopedia.com Encyclopedias 
engadget.com News, Technology 
huffingtonpost.com News 
latimes.com News, Newspapers 
match.com Dating 
music.aol.com Music 
shoutcast.com Radio 
slashcontrol.com† News, Television († now huffingtonpost.com/tv) 
spinner.com Music 
techcrunch.com News, Technology 
theboot.com Music, Country/Bluegrass Music 
tourtracker.com Music, Tours, Concerts 
 
The actions performed on the sites listed in Table 4 included searching for 
Toyota dealers in Miami (on cars.com) and for information on Miami (on 
encyclopedia.com). Our user was listed as a man interested in men on match.com. 
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3.3 Yahoo! 
Table 5: First-party sites used to study Yahoo! 
 
Site Category 
autos.yahoo.com Automotive 
espanol.yahoo.com Portals, Spanish 
health.yahoo.net Health 
hotwire.com Travel 
lyricsmode.com Music, Lyrics 
mercurynews.com News, Newspapers 
monster.com Employment, Job Search 
nissanusa.com Automotive, Nissan 
ozonebilliards.com Shopping, Sports, Cue Sports 
realestate.yahoo.com Real Estate 
sfgate.com News, Newspapers 
travel.yahoo.com Travel 
webmd.com Health 
wunderground.com News, Weather 
xfinity.comcast.net Service Providers, Cable 
 
The actions performed on the sites listed in Table 5 included searching for “skin 
cancer” (on webmd.com), for “diabetes” (on health.yahoo.net), and for “Miami” 
(on realestate.yahoo.com, travel.yahoo.com, hotwire.com, monster.com, and 
wunderground.com). Our user’s location was listed as Seattle on monster.com. 
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3.4 BlueKai 
Table 6: First-party sites used to study BlueKai 
 
Site Category 
accuweather.com News, Weather 
azlyrics.com Music, Lyrics 
bankrate.com Personal Finance 
bmwusa.com Automotive, BMW 
cars.com Automotive 
cbsnews.com News 
cdkitchen.com Cooking 
cheaptickets.com Travel 
contactmusic.com Entertainment, Music, Movies 
gap.com Shopping, Clothing 
healthology.com Health 
miami.com Guides, Miami 
money.cnn.com News, Business 
style.com Fashion 
zdnet.com News, Technology 
 
The actions performed on the sites listed in Table 6 included searching for the 
weather forecast in Chicago (on accuweather.com), for flights from New York to 
Chicago (on cheaptickets.com), and for “skin cancer” (on healthology.com). 
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3.5 Test with Google properties after March 1, 2012 
There were only minor differences between our generic methodology and the 
methodology we used for the Google test we performed after Google’s recent 
privacy policy change [15]. In this test, we aimed to observe the potential use of 
information collected on Google properties to serve ads on non-Google sites. We 
therefore replaced three sites in the list given in Table 2 (metrolyrics.com, 
snagajob.com, tmz.com) with popular Google properties (Google+, Google Search, 
and YouTube). 
We created a Google account, signed in, and did not sign out of it throughout 
the test. Note that we unchecked the box shown in Figure 2 when creating the 
account. 
 
 
Figure 2: Personalization preference when creating a Google account 
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3.6 Summary 
We opted to examine the ad networks owned by Web giants Google, AOL, and 
Yahoo! and online data exchange BlueKai due to its distinct characteristics. For all 
third parties, we ran daily sessions with 15 first-party sites for a ten-day period. 
During the sessions, we captured the ads served by the relevant ad server and 
checked the APM after visiting each site. We used the information Web traffic 
analyzers provide about the sites to verify the information shown in the APM. We 
also recorded the HTTP traffic and inspected the HTTP headers to find out what 
is passed to the ad server in plaintext. Finally, we identified expected and 
unexpected types of advertising and developed a two-dimensional classification to 
illustrate the advertising practices we observed during our tests. 
 20 
 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Google 
A sample snapshot of the Google Ads Preferences Manager from our tests is shown 
in Figure 3. The demographic information is inferred based on the sites visited [14]. 
However, the age range has changed several times throughout the tests, although 
we kept visiting the same set of sites listed in Table 2 and performing similar 
actions on these sites. 
Figure 4 summarizes Google’s advertising practices we were able to identify. 
We adopted the terminology “some sessions” to refer to multiple, but no more than 
half of the sessions, and “most sessions” to refer to more than half, but not all, of 
the sessions. Light gray shading represents some, gray represents most, and dark 
gray represents all sessions. 
 21 
 
Figure 3: A sample snapshot of Google’s Ads Preferences Manager 
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Figure 4: Classification of Google’s advertising practices based on our test results 
(inner square: expected results, remaining boxes: unexpected results; 
light gray: observed in some sessions, gray: most sessions, dark gray: all sessions) 
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Note that, in [13], it is stated that “Google will not associate sensitive interest 
categories with your cookie (such as those based on race, religion, sexual 
orientation, health, or sensitive financial categories) and will not use these 
categories when showing you interest-based ads.” 
As an example, Figure 5 demonstrates leakage to DoubleClick1 on LinkedIn. 
 
GET 
/adi/linkedin.dart/home;optout=false;lang=en;tile=2;sz=300x250;v=4;u=sjta
jT8Or6xLr51Oe6R4kkR7;mod=250;title=en;func=acct;coid=3881;ind=68;csize=h;
zip=60637;cntry=us;reg=14;sub=0;jpos=0;con=a;edu=18319;gy=2002;gdr=m;seg=
499;sjt=40;extra%3Dnull;s=0;ord=264085484? HTTP/1.1 
Host: ad.doubleclick.net  
Referer: http://www.linkedin.com/home 
Figure 5: Leakage of personal information to DoubleClick from a LinkedIn profile 
 
We now provide sample DoubleClick (doubleclick.net) ads for each 
advertising practice seen in Figure 4. 
Generic advertising. No information pertinent to the user is used by the 
third party to serve ads that fall into this category. The ad shown in Figure 6 is an 
example of generic ads served by DoubleClick. 
 
                                                 
1 DoubleClick, a subsidiary of Google, is the Internet’s largest advertising company [37]. 
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Figure 6: A generic ad served by DoubleClick on tmz.com 
 
Location-based advertising. Figure 7 shows an example of ads served by 
DoubleClick based on IP-based geographic information. 
 
 
Figure 7: A location-based ad served by DoubleClick on accuweather.com 
 
Contextual advertising. Figure 8 presents an example of contextual ads 
served by DoubleClick. 
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Figure 8: A contextual ad served by DoubleClick on gaylife.about.com 
 
Location-based+contextual advertising. Figure 9 shows an example of ads 
rendered based on the context of the site and geographic location of the IP address. 
 
 
Figure 9: A location-based+contextual ad served by DoubleClick on medhelp.org 
 
Behavioral advertising. Figure 10 provides an example of ads customized 
based on the past online behavior of our user. 
 
 
Figure 10: A behavioral ad served by DoubleClick on nytimes.com after listening to music on 
Pandora 
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Figure 11: Google Ads Preferences Manager while visiting nytimes.com during a test session 
 
Several types of behavioral advertising are indicated in Figure 4. Note that 
there were a couple of “Music & Audio” categories in the Google Ads Preferences 
Manager (see Figure 11) at the time we observed the ad shown in Figure 10. 
In some cases, previous online behavior was combined with the current site’s 
context to serve ads (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: A contextual+behavioral ad served by DoubleClick while listening to smooth jazz on 
pandora.com after searches for “Miami” on accuweather.com, tripadvisor.com, and yelp.com 
 
Figure 13 shows how DoubleClick learned about our search for the weather 
forecast in Miami on accuweather.com. Although Google’s APM has the category 
“World Localities - North America - USA - Florida - Southern Florida - South 
Florida Metro - Miami-Dade,” this was never shown. 
 
GET /adj/accuwx.us.forecast/city-weather-
forecast;zip=33128;city=miami;state=fl;country=us;partner=accuweather;met
ro=mia;ctrav=1;strav=1;cuwx=7;fc1wx=16;fc1hi=85;fc1lo=75;fc2wx=17;fc2hi=9
0;fc2lo=75;fc3wx=17;fc3hi=90;fc3lo=75;ulang=tr;vabeachtemp=70;vabeachwx=4
;ixc=10101;pos=top;sz=980x30,728x90;tile=1;ord=691599837061021000? 
HTTP/1.1 
Host: ad.doubleclick.net 
Referer: http://www.accuweather.com/us/fl/miami/33128/city-weather- 
forecast.asp 
Figure 13: Leakage to DoubleClick while performing a search on accuweather.com 
 
Location-based+behavioral advertising. Figure 14 presents an example of 
ads rendered based on the past online behavior of our user and geographic location 
of the IP address. 
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Figure 14: A location-based+behavioral ad served by DoubleClick on accuweather.com after 
visiting a page about Tiger Woods (an American golfer) on TMZ Sports 
 
It should be noted that, at the time we observed the ad shown in Figure 14, 
Google Ads Preferences Manager did not list any relevant interest categories (see 
Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15: Google Ads Preferences Manager while visiting accuweather.com during a test session 
 
Profile-based advertising. We listed the location as Chicago in our user’s 
Pandora profile and confirmed that this information was leaked to DoubleClick 
(see Figure 16). 
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GET /adj/pand.default/prod.radio;index=1;interaction=station;fam=-
1;artist=G162;gcat=g111g461;genre=rock;ag=32;gnd=1;zip=60637;hours=0;comp
ed=0;exp=0;fb=0;dma=602;clean=0;msa=005;st=IL;co=17031;et=0;pin=0;aa=1;hi
sp=0;hhi=0;u=index*1!interaction*station!fam*-
1!artist*G162!gcat*g111g461!genre*rock!ag*32!gnd*1!zip*60637!hours*0!comp
ed*0!exp*0!fb*0!dma*602!clean*0!msa*005!st*IL!co*17031!et*0!pin*0!aa*1!hi
sp*0!hhi*0;tile=1;sz=2000x2;ord=1329614846952195567 HTTP/1.1 
Host: ad.doubleclick.net 
Referer: http://www.pandora.com/radioAdEmbed.html?cb=13296148469807485 
Figure 16: Leakage of the zip code (along with other information) from a Chicago-based user’s 
Pandora profile 
 
Figure 17 shows an example of ads based on the information in a user profile—
a Pandora profile in this case. Note that the ad was served on Pandora as well. 
 
 
Figure 17: A profile-based ad served by DoubleClick on pandora.com 
 
Sensitive behavioral advertising. We also observed Google ads related to 
our user’s past sensitive behavior as indicated in Figure 4. As part of our tests, we 
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searched for “skin cancer” on medhelp.org, and this search query was passed to 
DoubleClick as shown in Figure 18. 
 
GET 
/adi/medhelp.search/search;area=search;logged_in=no;ss=6;action=index;env
=production;tile=1;sz=728x90;site=medhelp;dcopt=ist;position=leader;dc_re
f=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.medhelp.org%2Fsearch%3Futf8%3D%2526%2523x2713%253B%26q
uery%3Dskin%2Bcancer%26camp%3Dtop_nav_search;ord=6972645583994780? 
HTTP/1.1 
Host: ad.doubleclick.net 
Referer: 
http://www.medhelp.org/search?utf8=%26%23x2713%3B&query=skin+cancer&camp= 
top_nav_search 
Figure 18: Leakage of a sensitive search query to DoubleClick from a medical 
Web site (medhelp.org) 
 
We then observed cancer-related ads on multiple Web sites. An example of 
those ads is shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19: A sensitive behavioral ad served by DoubleClick on the “Tech and Science News” page 
of cbsnews.com 
 
One of the sites we visited was gaylife.about.com, and we observed many ads 
targeted at people who are interested in men on multiple other sites. An example 
of such ads is shown in Figure 20. None of these ads included the word “gay,” but 
the inferred gender of our user was male. 
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Figure 20: A suspected sensitive behavioral ad served by DoubleClick on 
macmillandictionary.com 
 
Location-based+sensitive behavioral advertising. During our tests, we 
received Google ads not just from DoubleClick, but from other ad servers of 
Google, including 2mdn.net, googleadservices.com, and googlesyndication.com. 
Some of these ads included sensitive behavioral information. For instance, the ad 
shown in Figure 21 was served by Google Ad Services on pandora.com after 
searches for “skin cancer” on medhelp.org. Note that this search term was actually 
leaked to DoubleClick as shown in Figure 18. Google Ad Services may have learnt 
our interest in skin cancer from the context of the “Search Results” page on 
medhelp.org, where it also served ads related to skin cancer, or it may have 
received this information from DoubleClick. 
 
 
Figure 21: A sensitive behavioral ad served by Google Ad Services on pandora.com 
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Given that Tufts Medical Center is located in Boston, Massachusetts, and we 
ran our tests in Massachusetts, the ad shown in Figure 21 seems to utilize our 
geographic location as well. 
The Google test results are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Google test results 
 
Site / Search term Category 
Google Ads Preferences 
Manager 
Behavioral 
ads shown 
accuweather.com News, Weather News - Weather ✓ 
bloomberg.com News, Business Business & Industrial ✓ 
cbsnews.com News News ✓ 
gaylife.about.com Gay People — Suspected 
linkedin.com Professional Networking — — 
macmillandictionary.com Dictionaries, English 
Dictionaries & 
Encyclopedias 
✓ 
medhelp.org Health — ✓ 
metrolyrics.com Music, Lyrics Music & Audio ✓ 
nytimes.com News, Newspapers New - Newspapers ✓ 
pandora.com Radio Music & Audio - Radio ✓ 
snagajob.com Employment, Job Search Jobs & Education ✓ 
tmz.com 
News, Entertainment, 
Celebrities 
Celebrities & Entertainment 
News 
✓ 
toyota.com Automotive, Toyota Autos & Vehicles ✓ 
tripadvisor.com Travel 
Travel - Hotels & 
Accommodations 
✓ 
yelp.com Consumer Opinions — — 
Miami N/A — ✓ 
skin cancer N/A — ✓ 
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Some interest categories listed in Table 7 were shown intermittently. For 
example, the “Autos & Vehicles” category was often missing, but we constantly 
received automotive ads. 
As an anecdotal example, right after reading a piece of news about a well-
known gay person in an uncontrolled browser, we received the Google ad shown in 
Figure 22 on another site, which included the acronym “LGBT” (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender). 
 
  
Figure 22: An anecdotal example of ad targeting by Google 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
4.1.1 Disabling third-party cookies and opting out 
During these tests, we did not receive any ads from Google related to our behavior 
on the sites listed in Table 2. As expected, we received ads relevant to our 
behavior on the sites listed in Table 3 in the extra sessions. 
In the opt-out tests, we observed ads served by non-Google third parties related 
to our behavior on the sites listed in Table 2, which was also expected. An example 
of those ads is shown in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23: A behavioral ad served by Criteo [8] on reference.com 
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4.2 AOL 
Figure 24 shows a snapshot of AOL’s APM (the AdVisibility profile) from our 
tests. Note that AOL does not show demographic information. 
 
 
Figure 24: A sample snapshot of the AOL AdVisibility profile 
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Figure 25: Classification of AOL’s advertising practices based on our test results 
(inner square: expected results, remaining boxes: unexpected results; 
light gray: observed in some sessions, gray: most sessions, dark gray: all sessions) 
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We observed AOL ads served by such ad servers as advertising.com and atwola.com. 
Figure 25 summarizes AOL’s advertising practices we were able to identify. It should be 
noticed that these are all expected types of advertising. 
The AOL test results are summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: AOL test results 
 
Site / Search term Category AOL AdVisibility 
Behavioral 
ads shown 
autoblog.com Automotive Automotive ✓ 
autos.aol.com Automotive Automotive ✓ 
cars.com Automotive Automotive ✓ 
encyclopedia.com Encyclopedias — — 
engadget.com News, Technology Consumer Electronics ✓ 
huffingtonpost.com News News & Current Events — 
latimes.com News, Newspapers News & Current Events — 
match.com Dating — — 
music.aol.com Music Entertainment - Music — 
shoutcast.com Radio Entertainment - Music — 
slashcontrol.com† 
News, Television († now 
huffingtonpost.com/tv) 
Entertainment - Television — 
spinner.com Music Entertainment - Music — 
techcrunch.com News, Technology Consumer Electronics ✓ 
theboot.com 
Music, 
Country/Bluegrass Music 
Entertainment - Country 
Music 
— 
tourtracker.com Music, Tours, Concerts Entertainment - Music — 
Miami N/A — — 
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4.3 Yahoo! 
Figure 26 presents a snapshot of Yahoo!’s APM (Ad Interest Manager) from our 
tests. Yahoo! utilizes personal information readily available in the account of the 
last visitor signed in to Yahoo! using that browser, and states this in its APM. 
We observed Yahoo! ads served from such domains as yieldmanager.net and 
yldmgrimg.net. Figure 27 summarizes Yahoo!’s advertising practices we were able 
to identify. Our findings from the Yahoo! tests were similar to the AOL test 
results—i.e., we observed expected types of advertising. 
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Figure 26: A sample snapshot of Yahoo!’s Ad Interest Manager 
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Figure 27: Classification of Yahoo!’s advertising practices based on our test results 
(inner square: expected results, remaining boxes: unexpected results; 
light gray: observed in some sessions, gray: most sessions, dark gray: all sessions) 
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The Yahoo! test results are summarized in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Yahoo! test results 
 
Site / Search term Category 
Yahoo! Ad Interest 
Manager 
Behavioral 
ads shown 
autos.yahoo.com Automotive Automotive ✓ 
espanol.yahoo.com Portals, Spanish Spanish Language — 
health.yahoo.net Health General Health — 
hotwire.com Travel Travel ✓ 
lyricsmode.com Music, Lyrics — — 
mercurynews.com News, Newspapers — — 
monster.com Employment, Job Search — — 
nissanusa.com Automotive, Nissan Automotive ✓ 
ozonebilliards.com 
Shopping, Sports, Cue 
Sports 
— — 
realestate.yahoo.com Real Estate — — 
sfgate.com News, Newspapers — — 
travel.yahoo.com Travel Travel ✓ 
webmd.com Health General Health — 
wunderground.com News, Weather — — 
xfinity.comcast.net Service Providers, Cable — — 
Miami N/A — — 
skin cancer N/A — — 
diabetes N/A — — 
 
4.4 BlueKai 
Figures 28, 29, and 30 show snapshots of each section of BlueKai’s APM (the 
BlueKai Registry) from our tests. 
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As mentioned earlier, BlueKai does not serve ads. Although we were able to 
identify redirections (HTTP 302) to a number of ad servers, HTTP 200 responses 
were generally 1x1 GIF images. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Sample snapshots of the “Basic Info” and “What Others Know About You” sections of 
the BlueKai Registry 
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Figure 29: Sample snapshots of the “Location & Neighborhood” and “Hobbies & Interests” 
sections of the BlueKai Registry 
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Figure 30: Sample snapshots of the “Things You May Want to Buy” and “Things You May Have 
Bought” sections of the BlueKai Registry 
 
The BlueKai test results are summarized in Table 10. 
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Table 10: BlueKai test results 
 
Site / Search term Category BlueKai Registry 
accuweather.com News, Weather — 
azlyrics.com Music, Lyrics Music 
bankrate.com Personal Finance Financial Products & Services 
bmwusa.com Automotive, BMW Autos 
cars.com Automotive Autos 
cbsnews.com News — 
cdkitchen.com Cooking — 
cheaptickets.com Travel — 
contactmusic.com Entertainment, Music, Movies Music 
gap.com Shopping, Clothing — 
healthology.com Health — 
miami.com Guides, Miami — 
money.cnn.com News, Business Financial Products & Services 
style.com Fashion — 
zdnet.com News, Technology — 
Chicago N/A — 
New York N/A — 
skin cancer N/A — 
 
4.5 Test with Google properties after March 1, 2012 
In this test, we observed the same types of advertising as in Figure 4. We were also 
able to identify cases in which sensitive information we provided only on Google 
properties was used to serve ads on non-Google sites. For instance, Figure 31 shows 
an ad served by DoubleClick on cbsnews.com after searches for “diabetes” on 
Google. 
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Figure 31: An ad served by DoubleClick on cbsnews.com after searches for “diabetes” on Google 
 
We received the ad shown in Figure 32 from another ad service run by Google, 
Google Ad Services, on macmillandictionary.com after watching videos on the 
Bible on YouTube. 
 
 
Figure 32: An ad served by Google Ad Services on macmillandictionary.com after watching 
videos on the Bible on YouTube 
 
4.6 Summary 
We evaluated the accuracy and completeness of the information in the APMs 
provided by AOL, BlueKai, Google, and Yahoo!. Another facet of our work was to 
assess how third parties render ads based on users’ browsing behavior. We 
provided specific instances of advertising practices and illustrated our test results 
using a two-dimensional classification. Also, we presented sample HTTP headers 
that demonstrate leakage to the ad server in plaintext. Our findings revealed cases 
in which even sensitive information was leaked as part of an HTTP header and was 
used to serve ads on multiple sites. 
 45 
 
 
Chapter 5: Facebook 
Although Facebook does not offer an APM, we also examined it in response to the 
recent debate over its data collection practices [43]. We used a similar methodology 
for this test to the one explained in Chapter 3. We ran 10 daily sessions with the 
first-party sites listed in Table 11 and captured all the ads served by Facebook. We 
never logged out of Facebook and did not “like” any of these sites. 
The actions performed on the sites listed in Table 11 included searching for 
“Chicago” (on mapquest.com) and for flights from New York to Chicago (on 
expedia.com). 
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Table 11: First-party sites used to study Facebook 
 
Site Category 
ae.com Shopping, Clothing 
azlyrics.com Music, Lyrics 
bodybuilding.com Sports, Bodybuilding 
cancer.org Health, Cancer 
chevrolet.com Automotive, Chevrolet 
consumerguideauto. 
howstuffworks.com 
Automotive 
directv.com Service Providers, Digital Satellite 
drugs.com Health, Drugs/Medications 
entertainment.msn.com Entertainment 
expedia.com Travel 
mapquest.com Maps 
miami.com Guides, Miami 
movies.yahoo.com Movies 
movietickets.com Shopping, Movie Tickets 
wsj.com News, Business 
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Figure 33: Classification of Facebook’s advertising practices based on our test results 
(inner square: expected results, remaining boxes: unexpected results; 
light gray: observed in some sessions, dark gray: all sessions) 
 
Figure 33 summarizes Facebook’s advertising practices we were able to identify, 
all of which are expected types of advertising. As an anecdotal example, however, 
after visiting cancer-related Web sites in an uncontrolled browser, we observed the 
Facebook ad shown in Figure 34 on a Facebook account not used for testing. 
 
 
Figure 34: An anecdotal example of ad targeting by Facebook 
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5.1 Summary 
Although Facebook does not offer an APM, we also examined it by virtue of its 
much-debated data collection practices. For this test, we used a similar 
methodology to our generic methodology. All of Facebook’s advertising practices 
we identified were expected types of advertising. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Directions 
As public concern over behavioral targeting has been growing lately, an increasing 
number of ad networks offer ad preferences managers (APMs) that show collected 
and/or inferred information about users. In this work, we investigated the accuracy 
and completeness of the information contained in such APMs and proposed a 
structured methodology for APM validation. Another facet of our work was to 
assess how third parties render ads based on users’ browsing behavior. We 
identified expected and unexpected types of advertising and developed a two-
dimensional classification to illustrate the advertising practices we observed during 
our tests. Our findings revealed cases in which even sensitive information was 
leaked as part of an HTTP header and was used to serve ads on multiple sites. 
The rise of computational advertising has triggered systematic research on 
related systems. There is considerable ongoing effort to develop effective 
measurement methodologies for online advertising networks. It is important to note 
 50 
that this study is a snapshot in time. Our methodology can be used to reexamine 
the third-party aggregators we studied (AOL, BlueKai, Facebook, Google, and 
Yahoo!) or to examine other third parties. Moreover, it would be possible to gain a 
better understanding of online advertising practices by automating the testing 
process. 
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